I. INTRODUCTION In United States v. Armstrong, 1 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standard of proof for a defendant in a criminal prosecution to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution defense. The five African-American defendants in Armstrong were arrested in a multi-agency sting operation for selling cocaine base. 2 They alleged that they were targeted for federal prosecution because of their race, 3 and claimed that they were entitled to discovery from the Government because they met the threshold "colorable basis" standard. 4 The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard to the discovery motion by failing to require the defendants to prove that "others similarly situated" were not prosecuted. 5 Moreover, the Court found that selective prosecution defenses are different from other defenses bearing directly on the merits of the case-in-chief, and, therefore, discovery of selective prosecution claims is not covered by Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 16.6 The case was remanded for further proceedings. 7 This note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Armstrong imposes a barrier that is too high for almost any defendant alleging selective prosecution to obtain discovery, thus making the already difficult claim of race-based selective prosecution virtually impossible to prove. Additionally, this note argues that the Court should have adopted Justice Marshall's three-prong test from his dissent in Wayte v. United States, 8 which requires a defendant to meet a lower threshold to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution defense than to prove the claim on the merits at trial.
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countered involved challenges by Chinese citizens to local ordinances in San Francisco. 1 8 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 19 the Supreme Court found that San Francisco authorities selectively enforced zoning ordinances against resident Chinese, but almost never against whites. 20 Although facially neutral, the Court found that the San Francisco ordinances were enforced on a discriminatory basis, relying on the statistical disparity between Chinese and non-Chinese applicants for wooden laundry licenses. 2 1 The Court observed:
[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is applied... with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
22
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court directly addressed a claim of selective prosecution in Ah Sin v. Witman, 23 though the Court rejected the respondent's allegations. 24 Ah Sin, a Chinese citizen, petitioned a California state court for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 5 He alleged that a San Francisco county ordinance prohibiting persons from setting up gaming tables in rooms barricaded to stop police from entering violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ordinance was enforced exclusively against persons of Chinese ancestry. The Court rejected this argument stating that "[there is no averment that the conditions and practices to which the ordinance was directed did not exist exclusively among the Chinese, or that there were other offenders against the ordinances than the Chinese, as to whom it was not enforced." 27 As a result, since Ah Sin, to prove an equal protection violation, those asserting selective prosecution claims must establish that others similarly situated were not prosecuted. 28 In Oyler v. Boyles, 29 repeat offenders challenged a West Virginia state law that imposed a requisite duty on prosecutors to seek mandatory sentences. 3 0 The petitioners argued that the prosecutors' SELECTIVE PROSECUTION action denied "equal protection to those persons against whom the heavier penalty is enforced." 3 ' Rejecting the petitioner's contentions as insufficient, 3 2 the Court stated that the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.
3 3
Until Armstrong, Wayte v. United States 3 4 set forth the most recent iteration of the standards necessary to prove a selective prosecution claim. 3 5 In Wayte, the defendantwas charged with knowingly and willfully failing to register for the draft with the Selective Service. 6 The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was selectively prosecuted, since he and the other thirteen "vocal" opponents of the registration program were targeted out of an estimated 674,000 non-registrants. 3 7 Setting forth a two-prong test, the Court found that Wayte failed to prove that the government engaged in discriminatory treatment and that the government was motivated by discriminatory intent. 38 The Majority focused both on the treatment of the defendant as well as the motivation behind the prosecutor's decision to go forward with the charges. 3 9 Lower courts thereafter used this two-prong test. 31 Id at 451. Petitioners introduced evidence that 904 offenders "who were known offenders throughout the state of West Virginia" were not sentenced under the mandatory statutes and appended statistical date to support their contentions. Id. at 455. One petitioner also alleged that out of six men prosecuted under the West Virginia statute, he was the only one who was sentenced. Id. at 454-55.
32 Defendants in Oyler failed both to prove that prosecutors had knowledge of the defendants' prior offenses, and that the prosecutors were motivated by discriminatory motives. Id. at 456. -5 The standards developed in Wayte closely followed those in United States v. Berrios% 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). In Benio the defendant was charged with holding union office within five years after a conviction for a felony for arson. Id. at 1209. Alleging a defense of selective prosecution for his "outspoken" support of Senator McGovern in the 1972 Presidential Race, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges after the Government failed to comply with an order requiring disclosure of a memorandum. Id. at 1209-10. The Second Circuit's requirement that the defendant provide "some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense" became an oft-quoted threshold of proof Id. at 1211. 36 470 U.S. at 603-04. 37 Id. at 604.
38 I& at 608-10. 39 Id.
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B. OTHER RELATED EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
In Batson v. Kentucky, 40 the Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of ajury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of preemptory challenges. 4 1 The defendant must prove that: (1) "he is a member of a cognizable racial group;" 42 (2) the prosecutor exercised preemptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from the venire; 43 and (3) considering all relevant circumstances 44 "[it raised] an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of the their race." 4 5 The Court held that once the defendant makes the relevant showing, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to explain adequately the racial exclusion.4 Moreover, the prosecution must "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried."
47
Castaneda v. Partida 48 addressed the question of an equal protection violation in grand jury selection. 49 The Mexican-American plaintiff in Castaneda alleged a denial of due process and equal protection because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the county grand jury that convicted him. 5 0 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun set forth a three-prong test for the party alleging the violation: (1) the party is a member of a group that "is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied;" 5 1 (2) the party must prove exclusion by "comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time;" 5 2 and (3) that this selection is subject to abuse. 5 3 This test establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden
Civil Rules 26(b) and 34
In the civil context, liberal discovery is the cornerstone of the notice pleading system envisioned by Judge Clark in establishing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56 Rule 26(b) governs the scope of discovery, 5 7 and Rule 34 controls the production of documents. 58 Rules 26(b) and 34 were designed to work closely together. 5 9 There are four requirements that a party seeking discovery must meet under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34: 1) the requested discovery must not be privileged; 60 2) the requested discovery must be "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party;" 6 ' 3) the requested discovery must be in the "possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served;" 62 and 4) trial preparation materials are available only upon a showing "that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the papers... and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." [Vol. 87
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The 1966 amendment changed and substantially expanded the Rule. 7 2 The 1966 amendments required a defendant seeking discovery to prove "materiality to the preparation of his defense and that his request is reasonable." 78 Earlier versions of the Rule had permitted discovery of books, papers, documents or tangible objects only if they were obtained from or belonged to the defendant. 7 4 The 1966 Rule also provided the government with work product immunity-reports, memoranda and other internal government documents produced by government agents in connection with a criminal case were exempt from discovery. 75 At the time, the changes were vigorously debated.
76
As Justice Brennan noted, "few issues raise more sharply the basic ideological clash between opposed theories of criminal justice." b. The Modern Rule
Rule 16 was substantially revised in 1974 to "give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the defense." 78 The current Rule 16(a) (1) (C) provides in part:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
79
The Advisory Committee stated that "[t]he rule is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. It is not intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in appropriate cases." 80 As revised, Rule 16(a) (1) (C) eliminated the materiality and reasonableness standards (a) the defendant shows that the disclosure of the document or tangible object is material to the defense, (b) the government intends to use the document or tangible object in its presentation of its case in chief, or (c) the document or tangible object was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.
82
Rule 16(a) (2) was also clarified to "make clear that the work product of the government attorney is protected." 8 3 Rule 16(a) (2) exempts from inspection by defendants "reports, memoranda, or other internal documents made by the attorney for the government or other government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case," 84 thereby limiting the scope of discovery.
Inherent Powers of the Court
Additionally, aside from the Federal Rules, courts are traditionally said to possess inherent powers of ordering discovery. 85 Thus, "to the extent that Rule 16 does not express a policy prohibiting discovery not explicitly authorized by the rules, the court is free, either by local rules or by adjudication, to permit discovery on the basis of inherent 87 All prior Supreme Court opinions concerned the claim of selective prosecution on the merits. 88 Justice Marshall argued that Wayte was, "first and foremost a discovery dispute," 9 since the case arose after procedural wrangling between the defendants and the prosecution. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court for the Central District of California granted the petitioners' request for discovery on their defense of selective prosecution and directed the government to produce certain documents. 90 The government partially complied but refused to hand over the remaining documents, claiming executive privilege. 91 As a result, Justice Marshall stated that, Wayte need not have made out a full prima facie case in order to be entitled to discovery. A prima facie case, of course, is one that if unrebutted will lead to a finding of selective prosecution. It shifts to the Government the burden of rebutting the presumption of the unconstitutional action. But a defendant need not meet this high burden just to get discovery; the standard for discovery is merely nonfrivolousness.
92
Adapting the three-prong test from Castaneda v. Partidag 3 Justice Marshall contrasted this "nonfrivolous" standard with a three part showing that the defendant should make for a successful prima facie case. He argued that the defendant must prove: (1) that he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class; (2) that a disproportionate number of this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution; and (3) that this selection was subject to abuse or was a not neutral process.
94
Moreover, Justice Marshall believed that there should be a lower burden for discovery in selective prosecution claims because "most of the relevant proof... will normally be in the Government's hands." 95 87 470 U.S. 598, 621 (1985) (Marshall,J., dissenting). The majority did not address the discovery issue, claiming that it was not raised in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, or at oral argument. Id. at 606 n.5. See also id. at 621 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting 
Caselaw
Tradition gives prosecutors almost unbridled discretion in deciding whom to charge, what the charge should be, and what plea bargain terms should be offered. 6 Little judicial oversight is permitted due to concerns regarding separation of powers, 97 high costs to the criminal justice system, 98 the guarantees of a speedy trial to the accused, 99 a potential a chilling effect on law enforcement, 10 0 as well as the inherent institutional expertise of prosecutors. 0 1 There is also a general presumption that the prosecution in a criminal case is undertaken by the prosecutor in good faith. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,1 0 3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the leeway that should be accorded to prosecutors. 0 4 The court stated that "so long as the prosector has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." This broad deference to prosecutorial discretion was reaffirmed in Wayte v. United States, where the Majority declared that the factors behind whether to prosecute "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." 10 6 The Court expressed concern regarding potentially negative impacts upon the judicial system, such as delay, chilling effect upon law enforcement and an undermining of prosecutorial effectiveness "by revealing the Government's enforcement policy." 
Implications for Defendants
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandate a specific sentence when certain elements are present in a particular case, thereby removing almost all discretion from federal trialjudges.' 08 They also extend drug penalty levels above the mandatory minimums. 10 9 The guidelines are promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), which was established under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.110 Under the statute, the Commission is permitted to submit changes in the guidelines to Congress.' 1 ' The changes automatically take effect 180 days after the submission unless Congress blocks the changes." 2 In 1986 and 1988 Congress enacted mandatory minimums for crack cocaine offenses.
Because of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and requisite mandatory minimums, the decision whether to prosecute in federal court or state court often means widely disparate prison terms for the defendant."1 3 This disparity is particularly evident in cocaine cases, cutors suggests that judicial evaluation of those decisions should be especially deferential."). 112 As promulgated, Congress established a disparity in penalties for crack and powder cocaine, which set out a 100 to 1 ratio. In early 1995, the United States Sentencing Commission recommended, 4-3, that the Sentencing Guidelines be changed to treat crack and powder cocaine alike for trafficking and for simple possession offenses. However, Congress passed legislation blocking the changes in the Guidelines and President Clinton signed into law a provision that retains the 100 to 1 ratio. On April 8, 1992, task force police executed search warrants on the hotel room in which the sales were transacted,°2 0 as well as on residences belonging to certain defendants. 12 1 The task force discovered an additional 9.29 grams of cocaine base and a loaded gun in the hotel room. 12 2 The task force also arrested Defendants Armstrong and Hampton in the hotel room.' 2 3 Defendants Mack, Martin and Rozelle were later arrested pursuant to bench warrants.' 2 4 As a result of the investigation, the task force seized a total of approximately 135 3 ' and sought discovery to obtain information he asserted would support that claim.' 3 2 The other four defendants timely joined the motion, which was heard by the district court on September 8,
1992.133
In support of their motion, the defendants offered the affidavit of Whoever-(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. 129 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW can defendant.1 3 6 The affidavit was accompanied by a study listing the twenty-four defendants, their race, whether they were prosecuted for dealing cocaine in addition to cocaine base, and the status of each case.1
37
The Government opposed the discovery motion, claiming that the decision whether to prosecute the defendants was made independent of race. 1 38 On September 8, 1992, the district court granted the discovery motion, finding that the defendants' showing was sufficient to justify discovery. 13 9 The district court ordered the Government to provide an explanation as to the number of cases at issue, the similarity of the charges and the fact that all defendants were of the same race. 1 40 Specifically, the order required the Government to: (1) provide a list of all cases from the previous three years in which the Government charged both cocaine base offenses and firearms offenses; 14 1 (2) identify the race of the defendants in those cases; 142 (3) identify whether state, federal or joint law enforcement authorities investigated each case; 143 and (4) explain the criteria used by the U.S. Attorney's Office in deciding to prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine base offenses. 144 On September 16, 1992, the Government moved for reconsideration of the district court's discovery order 1 45 and submitted affidavits from three law enforcement officers 146 and two Assistant United 136 Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1483. 137 Id. The filing stamp numbers on the closed cases in the study indicated that the defendants were prosecuted over a four-year period. Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1522 (RymerJ., dissenting). Other defendants alleging selective prosecution defenses had introduced this study in support of similar discovery motions in at least two other prosecutions in the Central District of California. Armstrong, 116 S. CL at 1483 n.1.
138 Armstrong 48 F.3d at 1511. Former Solicitor General Drew S. Days IH later explained that
[t] hese prosecutions involved more than twice the quantity necessary to trigger tenyear mandatory sentences; there were multiple sales involving multiple defendants, thereby indicating a substantial crack cocaine ring;, there were multiple federal firearms violations intertwined with the narcotics trafficking; the overall evidence was extremely strong, including audio and videotapes of the defendants; threats had been made to the arresting officers by one of the defendants; and several of the defendants had criminal histories including narcotics and firearm violations. 147 The affidavits stated that race played no role in the investigation of the named defendants and that the case had been referred for federal prosecution because it involved provable crack and firearms offenses that met the U.S. Attorney's guidelines.for federal prosecution.
14 8
The Government also submitted a list of all defendants charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. § § 841 and 846 over a three-year period' 49 and sections from a published 1989 Drug Enforcement Administration report detailing the sociological patterns of crack use and distribution in the United States.' 5 0
In response, the defendants submitted the affidavit of a defense attorney alleging that an intake coordinator at a Pasadena drug treatment center had told her that there are "an equal number of caucasian users and dealers to minority users and dealers." 1 5 ' Defendants also submitted an affidavit from an experienced defense attorney practicing in the Central District of California, alleging that, in his experience and conversations with "judges, lawyers and defendants," many non-blacks are prosecuted for crack offenses in state court; however, he had never handled, known of, or heard of a single federal crack cocaine case involving non-black defendants. 15 2 Additionally, the defendants submitted a Los Angeles Times newspaper article reporting grave racial inequities in crack cocaine sentencing.1 53 The district court denied the motion for reconsideration on December 29, 1992.154 When the Government indicated that it would years experience; a Special Agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms with three years experience at the BATF and three additional years experience as a narcotics officer, and a narcotics detective from the Inglewood, California, Police Department with three years experience in narcotics. A divided, three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the defendants' affidavit failed to establish a colorable basis for ordering discovery because it lacked a showing that others similarly situated were not prosecuted.' 5 7 The court of appeals quickly voted to rehear the case en banc. The en banc panel affirmed the district court's order of dismissal, 7-4, holding that a "colorable basis" standard permits discovery when the defendants "introduce some evidence tending to show the essential elements of selective prosecution and the government fails to explain it adequately."' 5 8
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that, by itself, statistical evidence about whom the government has prosecuted can establish a prima facie case of race-based selective prosecution. 159 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held that the discovery standard in selective prosecution defenses should be lower than the standard necessary to prove a prima facie case.' 60 As a result, the court of appeals believed that the Federal Public Defender study "raise[d] enough of a question to justify further inquiry."' 6 ' The en banc panel stated that "a defendant is not required to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated." 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW offense but rather is an "independent [Constitutional] assertion." 174 Thus, the Court stated that "[b]ecause respondents' construction of 'defense' creates the anomaly of a defendant's being able to examine all Government work product except the most pertinent, we find their construction implausible." 1 7 5 As construed by the majority, Rule 16 implicitly exempts selective prosecution defenses.
176
However, aside from Rule 16, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied that he would permit discovery through the inherent powers of the court 17 7 if the defendants met a "significant barrier" that was designed to weed out insubstantial claims.
178
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the equal protection issues raised by the defendants. 179 The defendants claimed that the Government violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants claimed that the prosecutors targeted African-Americans for prosecution in federal court, while whites were prosecuted in state court.°8 0 In addition, the defendants argued that they could prove selective prosecution without establishing that the Government failed to prosecute others similarly situated.181
Noting that a "selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive,"' 82 ChiefJustice Rehnquist reviewed the derivation of a prosecutor's power from the President's constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 8 3 The majority thus expressed concern "not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional function." 84 Reaching back to Ah Sin v. Wittman, l8 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist firmly asserted the requirement that "[t]o establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." 186 
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Sin involved federal review of a state conviction, Chief Justice Rehnquist extended the requirement of proof of similar situation to federal review of "one of the core powers of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, the power to prosecute."'1 8 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to the showing necessary to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim.',, He advocated a high threshold for proving discovery claims, stating, " [ t] he justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim."' 8 9 Rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's analysis, ChiefJustice Rehnquist held that a "colorable basis" standard depends on evidence that the Government failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated to the defendant. 190 Without such proof, the district court should not permit discovery. He stated that the defendant should be required "to produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not, and this requirement is consistent with our equal protection case law."' 9 1 Thus, the Defendants' study, which listed twenty-four defendants by race, whether they were prosecuted for dealing cocaine as well as crack, and the status of each case, did not meet the showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons and thus was not sufficient to obtain discovery.' 9 2
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
In a brief concurrence, Justice Souter stated that he joined the Court's opinion, but "in its discussion of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 only to the extent of its application to the issue in this case."'19 3
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburgjoined the majority opinion with the caveat that Appeal's contention that a "colorable basis" for selective prosecution claims did not require proof that others similarly situated were not being prosecuted. the opinion would be limited to only issues before the Court. 19 4 She stated that "the Court has decided a precise issue: whether the phrase 'defendant's defense,' as used in Rule 16(a) (1) (C), encompasses allegations of selective prosecution." 195 Justice Ginsburg reserved judgment on whether Rule 16(a) (1) (C) applies in "any other context" such as to affirmative defenses unrelated to the merits.
196

D. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer took issue with the majority's limitation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to documents related to the case-in-chief. 1 97 He stated that "the language and legislative history make clear that the Rule's drafters meant it to provide a broad authorization for defendants' discovery, to be supplemented if necessary in an appropriate case."' 9 8 Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's exclusion of other defenses from Rule 16 (a) (1) (C),1 99 stating that " [t] o interpret the Rule in this limited way creates a legal distinction that, from a discovery perspective, is arbitrary." 20 0 Moreover, Justice Breyer warned that the majority's interpretation would lead to "two full parallel sets of criminal discovery principles," 20 ' a division that he believed was not justified from the Justice Breyer also rejected the majority's concern regarding the protection of work product. 2 03 He noted that the work product doctrine is not absolute, that the "work-product exception may itself contain implicit exceptions," 2 0 4 and that other rules of law can supplement, authorize, or require the same information that Rule 16 could mandate.
0 5
Finally, disagreeing with the majority, Justice Breyer asserted that 194 Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489 (GinsburgJ., concurring).
vens viewed the evidence presented by the defendants as credible, thereby agreeing with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that the district court judge acted "well within her discretion." 2 19 V. ANALYSIS The claim of selective prosecution treads a fine constitutional line between the responsibilities of the Government to prosecute criminals and the right of the accused to be accorded equal protection under the law. The Article II constitutional mandate that the Executive Branch "take care" that the laws are enforced directly conflicts with the Equal Protection rights enunciated in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Fearing an encroachment on the Executive Branch's power, the Supreme Court in Armstrong adopted a very high threshold for obtaining discovery in selective prosecution defenses. The effect of this high threshold is to practically merge the requirements for obtaining discovery in a selective prosecution claim with the threshold for proving such a claim on the merits. This note argues that this "clear evidence" test imposes a heightened pleading standard for those alleging claims of selective prosecution defenses, particularly for those alleging race-based selective prosecution defenses. In Part A this note argues that a heightened standard for discovery of government documents is not warranted by the language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Part B argues that the Court wrongly rejected the use of statistical studies to meet the defendants' burden of proof. Part C argues that without statistical studies, post-Armstrng defendants have little else to meet the "clear evidence" threshold required by the Majority. Finally, Part D urges an adoption ofJustice Marshall's "nonfrivolous" standard as the required threshold showing to gain discovery on a selective prosecution claim. The Court's decision in Armstrong will place a "crippling burden of proof " 22 0 on defendants with legitimate claims, thereby installing a regime where "prosecutors ... are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." First, the Court created a heightened standard for discovery in selective prosecution defenses that is not warranted by the language in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his partial concurrence, Rule 16 sets out a "three-part categorization of the documents and other physical items that the Rule requires the Government to make available to the defendant." 224 This rule is not discretionary, but a mandatory limitation on the government. The majority, however, "creates a legal distinction that, from a discovery perspective, is arbitrary" 2 25 by setting up a separate system of discovery for those items that relate to the case-in-chief from those elements that relate to other defenses-even those defenses directly based in the Constitution. 22 6 As Justice Breyer correctly pointed out, there are a number of different ways in which the majority's stance in Armstrong influences motions to suppress and other areas that were traditionally considered under the aegis of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, but that are now no longer protected. 2 2 7 Indeed, defenses directly based on the Constitution should be accorded special protection, similar to those accorded to Brady v. Maryland, 2 28 and not relegated to a second-class treatment simply because they do not directly bear on the case-in-chief. Constitutional defenses strike at the core of our legal tradition and should be afforded as much protection-or even more-than the protection under the carefully constructed and liberalized Federal Rule 16.229 In 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW cedure. 23 1 In an unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that federal courts may not apply a "heightened pleading standard," more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.232 The Court contrasted the "short and plain statement" of Rule 8(a) with the heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9(b), and found that Rule 9(b) does "address... the question of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but doles] not include" the plaintiffs' action.
23 3
Yet, in this criminal context, the Majority in Armstrong adopted a "clear evidence" test as a threshold requirement to obtaining discovery-a stricter test than that created by the drafters of Federal Rule 16 and warranted by the language. The drafters intended to allow a liberalized discovery process, one that would allow a defendant the opportunity to uncover facts that may be crucial to her defense. While the ability to obtain discovery from the Government is not as complete as in the civil context, the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been liberalized since their creation to encourage the discovery of "material" evidence. Moreover, in enunciating a "clear evidence" test for discovery into selective prosecution claims, the Court ignored the traditional distinction between proving a prima facie case on the merits and proving the necessary showing to gain a discovery motion. 2 35 The defendants in Armstrong did not maintain that they were entitled to discovery of any item that they wanted-they claimed that they met a "colorable basis" threshold. 2 36 Under the "colorable basis" threshold, they sought discovery to find out if their contentions were meritorious.
In accordance with settled jurisprudence, the Majority correctly turned to Wade v. United States 2 37 for the determination that some threshold showing is necessary to obtain discovery "to determine whether the Government based its decision on the defendant's race or religion," 2 38 but carried this threshold too far with the "demanding" 2 39 standard adopted. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that, " [ After following the clear precedent in Wayte that those claiming that they were selectively prosecuted need to prove that the decision to prosecute had a "discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose," 241 the Court essentially required the defendants to prove these two prongs at the discovery stage under the "clear evidence" standard. 242 This standard, thus, is a prerequisite, and heightened burden, for obtaining discovery from the government.
Yet, there are crucial differences between the level of proof that should be required at the discovery stage and the level of proof that should be required to prove a prima facie case under our system of liberal discovery. As the drafters of the modem Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure intended, discovery should be made available to help defendants prepare their defense. The effect of the majority's interpretation is to bar discovery that in other circumstances would satisfy the criteria enumerated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
B. THE COURT WRONGLY REJECTED THE USE OF STATISTICAL STUDIES
TO PROVE INFERENCES OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT IN PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING
In ordinary equal protection cases, a plaintiff alleging intentional race discrimination need only demonstrate the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 243 The majority in Armstrong nominally agreed that selective prosecution defenses should be judged according to "ordinary equal protection standards," 244 but then proceeded to apply a more stringent burden of proof than ordinary equal protection cases. 2 45 For example, the defendants in Armstrong urged the court to follow Batson v. Kentucky, 2 46 where "the special stringent evidentiary requirements of Swain were 'inconsistent with standards that have been developed.., for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.'"247
The defendants also urged the analogy with Batson because a "claim of selective prosecution,... like a claim of systematic discrimi-240 I& at 1488. In rejecting the defendants' analogies to Batson and Hunter, the Court manipulated the holdings in these cases, claiming that Hunter proved that there was "indisputable evidence that the state law had a discriminatory effect on blacks as compared to similarly situated whites.... Hunter thus affords no support for [the defendants'] position." 25 ' Moreover, the Court skirted the defendants' contentions regarding the applicability of Batson, failing to explain why the holding in that case, which directly applied to the allegations of disparities in treatment of races in the judicial system, 2 5 2 should not be applied to the facts in Armstrong.
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Perhaps, most significantly, in the wake of Armstrong, there is a question regarding what weight of authority, if any, should be allocated to statistical studies delineating racial disparity in the prosecution of blacks and whites. 2 54 The Court flatly rejected the defendants' study of prosecutorial inequity in the Central District of California, 255 and foreclosed the defendants' ability to conduct further research into the issue by denying the discovery motion.
Yet, there are studies detailing wide disparities in prosecution in the Central District of California, and in numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States.
25 6 For example, the Berk Study,
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ecute an individual can be accounted for.
2 6 9
For example, proponents of statistical studies stress that the multiple regression analysis used in many of these studies can control for hundreds of potential factors. 270 Thus, an expert using multiple regression can account for prosecutorial decisions to prosecute in federal over state court. As one commentator has stated, Because of the myriad of factors that could affect a prosecutor's decision to bring charges, including the strength of the evidence, the culpability of the offender, and the need to send out various enforcement signals, courts are generally unwilling to infer a discriminatory intent from nonenforcement statistics... Yet, it is usually difficult to get evidence of discriminatory intent beyond such statistics.
71
Additionally, defendants face the problem that data on which they could potentially base their threshold showing of similar situation is very difficult to obtain. The Court suggested that the defendants in Armstrong could have "investigated whether similarly situated persons of other races were prosecuted by the State of California, were known to federal law enforcement officers but were not prosecuted in federal court." 2 72 Similarly, Justice Breyer also agreed that "it should have been fairly easy" for the defendants to obtain this information. 273 Yet, it is not clear from the Court's opinion where the defendants in this case could obtain information from law enforcement authorities regarding those arrestees who were not prosecuted. Indeed, it appears that data regarding those "similarly situated" is precisely what the defendants attempted to uncover through their discovery motion. As the defense counsel stated at oral argument, "The State [of California] court system is broken up into many, many different courts. In fact there is no centralized record-keeper of crack and powder cocaine cases, . . . and the information is not accessible to defendants with ease, and in some instances is not accessible at all." 2 74
There are also wider-ranging problems for defendants in gathering data regarding prosecutorial decision-making and sentencing.
